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Abstract: Marino & Merskin (2019) demonstrate that sheep are more cognitively complex than
typically thought. We should be cautious in interpreting the implications of these results for
welfare considerations to avoid perpetuating mistaken beliefs about the moral value of
intelligence as opposed to sentience. There are, however, still important ways in which this work
can help improve sheeps’ lives.
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Marino & Merskin (2019) (M&M) review the research on sheep intelligence to make a convincing
case that sheep are far more sophisticated cognitively than they are typically given credit for. They
have well-developed capacities for (among others) memory, learning and social behaviour. In this,
M&M certainly succeed in their aim of compiling evidence to overturn popular stereotypes of
sheep as simple and unintelligent. There is a worry, however, that the effort might be misdirected
towards the wrong aim.
M&M are almost certainly right in arguing that people tend to rank animals according to
a scala naturae in which nonhuman animals are ordered on the characteristics valued by us —
hence on their similarity to us — and that this strongly influences how we treat animals. If we
adopt this as the basis of our value system and want to improve the treatment of sheep, it makes
sense to try to show that sheep have these “valuable” characteristics and thus deserve better
treatment. However, this still endorses the idea that our treatment of animals should rely on their
intelligence. Although M&M are probably right that this is how many people make their moral
decisions today (see also Broom 2010, Mendl & Paul 2004), it is not the case that they should do
so. Research like this might convince people to change their treatment of animals, given their
current value systems (although Davis 2019 might be right that even this is unlikely); but it is
arguably more important to work on changing people’s value systems. What if the research had
not shown that sheep were particularly complex cognitively? What if the popular conception had
been borne out, and sheep were shown to be simple-minded. Should we then allow ourselves to
continue to dismiss them? Intuitively, no. They are still sentient animals, with feelings that matter;
and it is on this basis that we should be making our moral decisions.
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Most commonly accepted accounts of animal welfare and moral status do not consider
intelligence to be the morally relevant characteristic. Rather, they say that sentience, or the ability
to experience positive and negative affective states, is what we should be concerned with (e.g.,
Dawkins 1980, Mellor 2016, Singer 1995). Going back to Bentham (1879): “the question is not,
Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?” (p. 309). Intelligence, or cognitive
complexity, is not even a good guide to sentience; the link is a tenuous one and has been widely
criticized (e.g., Dawkins 2001, Mendl & Paul 2004). This is well captured by Dawkins (2001): “you
don’t need to be very clever to feel pain or hunger or fear. Negative emotions that we refer to as
suffering are not particularly intellectual” (s27). Demonstrating the ability to feel, as M&M do in
Section 6, is far more important in welfare considerations than demonstrating the ability to think.
This does not mean that the work reviewed by M&M is not useful. Establishing the
cognitive capacities of sheep in this way can still provide a benefit, in two different ways. First, as
also suggested by Horback (2019), it tells us something about how to consider the welfare of
sheep. When considering welfare, we need to think about which conditions are better or worse
for the animals. They will depend highly on the features of the individuals and species, such as
their tolerance for particular environmental conditions, diet, and social behaviour. Cognitive
abilities also play a role in determining what kinds of cognitive and behavioural challenges are
required in the environment to provide appropriate mental stimulation, such as behavioural
enrichment (Bekoff 1994, Mendl & Paul 2004). Learning and memory will play a role in
determining how animals process stimuli and therefore whether they find them pleasant or
aversive (Duncan & Petherick 1991). Evidence for individuality also gives us reason to consider
the preferences of individual sheep in their treatment, perhaps by giving them a choice over
different conditions, rather than applying a blanket condition to all of them. M&M’s evidence can
also help influence how those working directly with sheep – stockpeople and handlers – respond
to and interact with their animals, leading to measurable improvements in animal behaviour,
health, and reproduction (Hemsworth & Coleman 2010).
Research on animal cognition and intelligence is valuable for improving animal welfare,
but we should ensure we are using it in the right way, not perpetuating erroneous beliefs or
values. It is animal feelings, rather than intelligence, that ground our moral concern.
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